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Abstract
We examine the temporal stability of risk preference measures obtained by
different elicitation methods in a controlled laboratory experiment at two distinct
times. Our results indicate remarkable temporal stability of risk measures at the
aggregated level and temporal instability at the individual level. We control
for the impact of, first, personality traits, and second, performance realized in
a market game. When better market performers demonstrate more stable risk
preferences, the impact of personality traits is marginal.
Keywords: Time stability, Risk Preferences, Personality Theory, Experimental eco-
nomics
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1 Introduction
In economic theory, risk preferences play an important role in understanding behavioral
differences observed between individuals (e.g. health and investment portfolios (Barsky
et al., 1997) or occupational choice (Bonin et al., 2007)). Consequently, the question of
temporal stability of risk preferences is important for the resolution of, first, economic
theories under uncertainty and, second, public policies that are based on the assump-
tion about agents’ risk degrees. The elicitation of risk preferences and their utilization
largely rests on the assumption that risk preferences are stable over time (e.g. Andersen
et al. (2008a) and Andersen et al. (2008b)).
A growing body of literature has explored to what extent individual risk preferences
are temporally stable. Overall, results demonstrate a general tendency of temporal
stability at the aggregated level. Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008) and Malmendier and
Nagel (2011) examined the risk preference stability with panel-study data from the
field. The stability of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) parameter was investi-
gated by Wehrung (1984) analyzing the preference of business executives with a 1-year
interval. Harrison et al. (2005) tested the CRRA by using the Holt and Laury (2002)’s
procedure over a period of 5-6 months. Further, the stability of the CRRA parameter
was studied by Goldstein et al. (2008) by using a fictious retirement saving scenario.
Smidts (1997) analyzed temporal stability of risk attitudes over one year using the cer-
tainty equivalent method. Sahm (2007) have demonstrated an important stability of
hypothetical self-attributing questions. Recently, Zeisberger et al. (2012) focused on
the stability of prospect theory parameters. While documenting remarkable stability of
parameter estimates at the aggregate level, they found significant instability over time
at the individual level.
This study extends the existing literature on temporal stability of risk preferences.
To analyze the temporal stability of risk preference measures, we consider the impact
of personality traits and the relative performance realized in a market game. Re-
cently, scholars have begun to integrate personality into economic decision making and
have demonstrated that personality plays a powerful role in predicting life outcomes1.
Personality theory can be viewed as a theory of fundamental psychological structure
determining human behavior (Costa and McCrae, 1992). It studies patterns of cogni-
tion, emotion and behavior that are relatively stable over time and across situations
(Borghans et al., 2008). There is now wide agreement on the five major dimensions
of personality at the broadest level: Openness to experience, Conscientiousness, Ex-
traversion, Agreeableness, Neuroticism (OCEAN). The Five-Factor Personality Inven-
tory Test introduced by Costa and McCrae (1992) is nowadays the most widely used
system of classification for personality traits. The score of an individual in these five
dimensions is believed to characterize her stable pattern of thoughts and feelings, and
1e.g. Anderson et al. (2011), Borghans et al. (2011), Roberts et al. (2007) and Almlund et al. (2011)
conclude that personality traits can predict important life outcomes and have even stronger predictive
power than economic preferences.
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can be used to predict her behavior (e.g. DeYoung and Gray (2009), Rustichini (2009)
and Roberts et al. (2007)). Regarding the link between risk preferences and the Big
Five measures Dohmen et al. (2010) indicate significant relationships between risk pref-
erences and openness to experience and agreeableness. Anderson et al. (2011) report
a weak correlation between risk preference and neuroticism. Nicholson et al. (2005)
have observed that extraversion and openness supply were linked with more larger risk
taking.
To accomplish our objective, 183 subjects participated to an experiment organized
in two sessions separated by a week interval. A near-at-hand method for analyzing
issues of temporal stability is to ask the same set of subjects to provide statements for
the same questions at different points of time. Are risk measures stable? Can person-
ality traits help to explain the temporal stability of risk preferences? Does individual
performance matter for the stability of risk preferences? Existing literature has also
demonstrated that individual risk preferences differ in respect to the used elicitation
method and are task and context dependent (e.g. Weber et al. (2002) and Isaac and
James (2000)). For this reason we use five different elicitation methods and investigate
which elicitation method is the most more reliable.
Our results support the findings in Zeisberger et al. (2012). We observe stability of
risk measures at the aggregate level: Subjects who expressed a low(high) risk prefer-
ence in Week 1 are those who expressed a low (high) risk preference in Week 2. At the
individual level, we observe that the degree of risk aversion has significantly increased
between Week 1 and Week 2. Regarding the individual relative performance, we find
that better market performers demonstrate more stable risk preferences. Personality
traits explain only marginally temporal stability of risk preferences.
The experimental design is described in the next section, followed by the results.
The final section discusses our results.
2 Experimental Design
Data reported in this paper were gathered in an experiment organized in two ses-
sions separated by one week interval. During the first session subjects completed a
behavioral questionnaire that elicited individual risk preferences and personality traits.
Individual risk preferences were elicited in a pen-and-pencil questionnaire, followed by
computer-based personality traits questionnaire including demographic questions. The
second session took place a week later. Here, subjects answered a replication of the
risk preference questionnaire from session 1 after having participated to a computer-
ized experimental asset market game (Smith et al., 1988) whose results are reported in
Strážnická (2012). Instructions to elicit risk preferences provided to subjects are in the
Appendix.
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2.1 Questionnaire
2.1.1 Risk Preference Measures
All subjects received a similar questionnaire in which risk preferences were measured in
the same order. The first four risk preference measures use hypothetical questions2, the
last one uses real monetary incentives. The measures were elicited as follows: Perception
of a Risky Lottery (RL): Subjects were presented a gamble question, represented by a
lottery that costs 10,000 Euro and pays out either 13,000 Euro or 10,100 Euro, each with
50% probability. Subjects were asked to state their risk perception of this lottery on a
Likert-scale from 0 to 10 where 0 indicates that the lottery is perceived as a risk-free
and 10 indicates that the lottery is perceived as very risky. In the rest of the paper, we
refer to the obtained score as to "RL". Risk Taking (RT): Subjects made an investment
decision between the lottery introduced in the previous task and a risk-free asset that
pays a certain dividend with a 5% interest rate. The score "RT" takes the value 0 if
the subject invests the whole amount into the risk free asset and 100 if she invests only
into the lottery. Certainty Equivalent (CE): Certainty equivalence method measured
individual risk preferences by repeatedly asking subjects whether they would prefer to
participate in a lottery or to receive a sure payment of x Euro, with x ranging from
1,000 Euro to 9,000 Euro. Survey Question (SQ): Participants rate their willingness to
take risk in financial decisions on a scale from 0 to 5 where "0=very low willingness"
and "5=very high willingness"3. Multiple price list method (HL): Holt and Laury (2002)
devise an experimental measure for risk aversion using a multiple price list design. Each
subject is presented with a choice between two paired lotteries, which can be called "A"
or "B". In our experiment, the payoffs for the lottery "A" are either 8 Euro or 6.4 Euro.
The riskier lottery B pays either 15.4 Euro or 0.4 Euro. Subjects are asked to make ten
decisions and choose one lottery for each pair. The ten decisions have similar payoffs,
however, moving down the table, the probability of the high-payoff outcome gradually
increases. At the end, one decision is randomly chosen by a roll of a ten-sided dice to
determine participant’s earnings. The outcome of the selected lottery is determined by
a second random draw at the end of the experiment. The total number of safe choices
determines individual risk preference.
2.1.2 Personality Traits
To elicit individual personality traits we used the 60-item French version of the ques-
tionnaire (Rolland et al., 1998). Questions are presented alternatively in positive and
negative phrasing. Answers are based on voluntary self-assessment. Subjects declare
on five-scale Likert-type scale whether they agree or disagree with each proposition.
2For example, Wärneryd (1996) concludes that questions involving hypothetical risky choices seem
to work quite well.
3This question makes a direct link with practice in investment advice that uses this classification
method as common practice. In addition, subjective risk attitudes on Likert scales are also used in
large scale surveys such as the Socio-Economic-Panel (SOEP) (see Dohmen et al. (2011)).
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2.2 Procedure and Subject Pool Descriptive Statistics
2.2.1 Procedure
When recruited, subjects were informed that the experiment will consist of two sessions
with a week break in between, that their presence to both sessions is necessary and that
payments for both sessions will be received at the end of the second session. Subjects
enrolled to both sessions before their participation to the first session. Data were
gathered at the laboratory of the Gate, Lyon, France, using the subject pool from local
business and engineering graduate schools. 183 subjects were recruited via the ORSEE
software (Greiner, 2004). The computerized parts of the experiment were programmed
with the z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007). The two sessions altogether lasted about
three hours and a half. Subjects earnings in the whole experiment, including the show-
up fee, averaged 45e.
2.2.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the subject pool. Overall, 183 subjects
participated to both experimental sessions4, of which 88 are males. The average age
is almost 22 years. For the personality traits measures, we use the T-score normalized
values5. They should be interpreted as the higher the score, the more pronounced the
personality trait is.
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Subject Pool
Mean Median STDV
Gender (1=Male) 0.48
Age 21.93 21 4.72
Neuroticism 50.22 51 10.12
Extraversion 49.62 51 9.79
Openness 50.05 51 9.97
Agreeableness 50.05 50 10.20
Consciousness 50.42 51 9.91
Nb of Observations 183
3 Results
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of the five risk measures. In order to facilitate
their interpretation, we converted them so that they are of comparable size and that
4Overall, 203 subjects participated to the first session but 20 subjects did not show up at the second
session. Econometric analysis does not indicate any specific characteristics of this group. Those who
did not participate to both sessions were eliminated from our analysis on stability of risk preferences.
5T-score normalized values of each personality trait are calculated separately for males and females
as:
individual value− (mean)/standard error ∗ 10 + 50
.
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they should be interpreted as the higher the score, the more risk averse an individual
is. We compare the distribution of risk preference measures between the first and the
second week using the Wilcoxon sign-rank test and the Spearman correlation. The
Spearman’s ρ test counts the correlation between risk measures elicited in Week 1 and
in Week 2 and reports whether the preference ranking, the order given by the measures,
is the same. This allows us to say whether there is a stability in the preference ranking
between Week 1 and Week 2 at the aggregated level. We observe an important stability
of risk measures between Week 1 and Week 2: Individuals who expressed a low(high)
risk preference in Week 1 are those who expressed a low (high) risk preference in Week
2. The Wilcoxon sign-rank test indicates that, at the individual level, the degree of risk
aversion has significantly increased between Week 1 and Week 2 (except for the "SQ"
measure).
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Risk Measures
Risk Measure mean sd p50 max min z ρ
HL (W1) 6.78 1.78 7 10 2 -2.399** 0.579***
HL (W2) 7.10 1.67 7 11 3
RL (W1) 2.02 1.57 1 8 1 -2.076** 0.721***
RL (W2) 2.22 1.57 2 9 1
RT (W1) 2.09 2.40 1 10 0 -2.862*** 0.674***
RT (W2) 2.60 2.47 2 10 0
CE (W1) 5.60 1.51 6 10 1 -8.396*** 0.400***
CE (W2) 6.73 1.38 7 10 2
SQ (W1) 3.63 1.08 4 6 1 -1.105 0.822***
SQ (W2) 3.67 0.99 4 6 1
Note: z of Wilcoxon sign-rank test. ρ of Spearman rank correlation. ∗ ∗ ∗ indicates significance
at the 0.001 level, ∗∗ at the 0.05 level, ∗ at the 0.10 level.
Figure 1 reports the evolution of individual risk preferences between Week 1 and
Week 2. Overall, we observe an important temporal stability of risk measures at the
aggregated level. At the individual level, a majority of subjects has increased its level
of risk aversion.
Figure 1: Evolution of Individual Risk Preference Measures
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Table 3 shows the distribution of the preference shift by measure, calculated as
the absolute difference between the degree of risk aversion in Week 1 and in Week 2.
The last line summarizes the percentage of subjects who made the same choice in both
sessions or switched by plus/minus one. We observe that the "RL" and "SQ" measures
are the most stable, as 84%, respectively 98%, of subjects made the same choice or only
switched by plus or minus one point.
Table 3: Distribution of Preference Shift
Preference shift HL RL RT CE SW
0 34% 60% 42% 14% 68%
‖1‖ 40% 24% 25% 44% 30%
‖2‖ 15% 8% 15% 26% 2%
‖3‖ 7% 4% 7% 9%
‖4‖ 1% 0% 4% 2%
‖5‖ 1% 2% 4% 2%
sup ‖5‖ 2% 2% 3% 3%
(0,± 1) 74% 84% 67% 58% 98%
3.1 Econometric analysis
In this section, we estimate the determinants of temporal stability of risk preferences
by means of Probit models in which robust standard errors are clustered at the session
level6. We use the preference shift as the dependent variable. For the analysis of the
first four risk measures, the dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a
subject made the same choice or switched by plus/minus one between Week 1 and
Week 2. If dependent dummy variable equals 1, we consider risk preferences stable.
As for the "SQ" measure, we consider only similar choices as temporally stable due
to the lack of heterogeneity in our data. Therefore, the dependent dummy variable
equals 1 if a subject made the strictly same choice in both Week 1 and Week 2. To
address our research question about the influence of individual characteristics on the
temporal stability of risk preferences, the independent variables include the T-scores of
personality traits, age and gender. Table 4 reports the results.
Our results indicate that the temporal stability of risk preferences is not correlated
with personality traits, age and gender. As for the impact of personality traits, openness
and its impact on the "HL" and "CE" measures is statistically significant. As the signs
associated with the coefficients are opposite, we cannot conclude about the direction
of the impact. Moreover, neuroticism has negative statistically significant impact on
the "RT" measure suggesting that those with lower neuroticism score are more stable
in "RT" task.
Further, we examine the impact of individual relative performance on the stability
of risk preferences. The individual relative performance is defined as the individual
6Clusters at the session level are considered according to the participation to the market experiment
organized in Session 2.
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Table 4: Determinants of Risk Preference Stability: Probit model
Dependent Variable: HL RL RT CE SQ
Reference Shift
Male -0.138 -0.211 0.307 0.121 0.143
(0.220) (0.287) (0.246) (0.120) (0.173)
Openness (T-score) 0.016** -0.001 -0.002 -0.016* 0.009
(0.008) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Consciousness (T-score) 0.009 -0.016 0.006 -0.006 0.001
(0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.007) (0.011)
Extraversion (T-score) -0.013 0.025* 0.003 -0.002 0.004
(0.011) (0.013) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012)
Agreeableness (T-score) -0.012 -0.013 -0.004 -0.005 0.002
(0.013) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.008)
Neuroticism (T-score) -0.007 0.003 -0.023** -0.003 -0.003
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.007) (0.010)
Age -0.006 -0.245** 0.144* -0.014 -0.976
(0.113) (0.119) (0.084) (0.093) (1.131)
Age2 -0.001 0.003** -0.002** 0.000 0.022
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.025)
Constant 1.485 5.105** -1.474 1.747 10.696
(1.975) (2.163) (1.855) (1.838) (12.478)
N 183 183 183 183 183
Wald chi2 15.44 17.70 14.17 5.86 2.26
Prob>chi2 0.051 0.024 0.077 0.663 0.972
Pseudo R2 0.048 0.061 0.045 0.016 0.024
log pseudo-likelihood -99.218 -75.059 -117.584 -122.528 -112.250
Clusters 21 21 21 21 21
Note: Standard errors clustered at the session level in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗ indicates significance at the 0.001
level, ∗∗ at the 0.05 level, ∗ at the 0.10 level.
performance realized during the market game in comparison with other subjects par-
ticipating to the same market. Table 5 reports the results of these probit regressions.
When controlling for the individual relative market performance, we observe that
better market performers are characterized by more stable risk preferences. This find-
ing indicates that a poor market performance influences the perception of risky stakes:
bad performers consider uncertain situations more risky.
Finally, one may also ask about the impact of other market variables, such as in-
dividual trading activity7 and bubble experience8. We did not find any correlation
between individual trading activity or bubble occurrence and temporal stability of risk
preferences. Results are shown in Tables 6 and 7 in the Appendix.
7Defined as the ratio of concluded transactions by a subject on the total number of transactions
realized during a market.
8We consider a bubble occurrence as defined in Noussair et al. (2001).
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Table 5: Relative Performance: Probit regression
Dependent Variable: HL RL RT CE SQ
Reference Shift
Male -0.217 -0.350 0.246 0.166 0.102
(0.236) (0.295) (0.259) (0.127) (0.163)
Openness (T-score) 0.016** -0.000 -0.003 -0.015 0.009
(0.008) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Consciousness (T-score) 0.015 -0.008 0.009 -0.008 0.003
(0.012) (0.012) (0.009) (0.007) (0.011)
Extraversion (T-score) -0.013 0.027* 0.003 -0.002 0.004
(0.011) (0.014) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012)
Agreeableness (T-score) -0.013 -0.016 -0.004 -0.005 0.002
(0.012) (0.011) (0.009) (0.012) (0.008)
Neuroticism (T-score) -0.007 0.005 -0.023** -0.003 -0.003
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (0.011)
Age 0.019 -0.202* 0.143* -0.014 -1.106
(0.117) (0.111) (0.087) (0.094) (1.059)
Age2 -0.001 0.003* -0.002* 0.000 0.025
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.024)
Relative Performance 0.212*** 0.416*** 0.157 -0.103 0.108
(0.068) (0.098) (0.102) (0.106) (0.124)
Constant 0.660 3.540* -1.758 1.951 11.867
(2.164) (1.836) (1.874) (1.835) (11.809)
N 183 183 183 183 183
Wald chi2 28.40 37.26 22.37 6.57 5.37
Prob>chi2 0.001 0.000 0.008 0.681 0.801
Pseudo R2 0.068 0.130 0.055 0.021 0.030
log pseudo-likelihood 697.153 -69.569 -116.351 -121.960 -111.623
Clusters 21 21 21 21 21
Note: Standard errors clustered at the session level in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗ indicates significance at the 0.001
level, ∗∗ at the 0.05 level, ∗ at the 0.10 level.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we examine the impact of personality traits and individual market per-
formance on the temporal stability of risk preference measures. We considered five
different elicitation methods. In line with existing literature, we observe important
temporal stability of risk measures at the aggregate level. At the individual level,
subjects have become more risk averse. Controlling for personality traits, we find lit-
tle support for linking the stability of risk preferences with personality traits. When
the impact of individual market performance is considered, we find that better mar-
ket performers demonstrate more stable risk preferences. Possible explanation could
be that poor performers are disappointed which makes them consider risky situations
in more conservative manner. Overall, we have observed the highest stability of the
self-reported survey question measure. This goes in line with Dohmen et al. (2011) who
have reported that survey question measure is a reliable predictor of risk attitudes.
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5 Appendix
5.1 Instructions
The experiment starts with a computer-based questionnaire to elicit personality traits
(the Five-Factor Personality Inventory Test (Costa and McCrae, 1992)). The paper-
based questionnaire follows.
Paper-based Questionnaire
Part I
Some Questions Concerning your Attitude toward Risk
In the following questionnaire, we would like to ask you to evaluate the riskiness of
given situations. There are no correct or wrong answers. We are interested in finding
out more about your personal preferences and attitudes with regard to the various
alternatives.
1. Consider the following situation:
(a) Question 1
You have an initial wealth of 10, 000 Euro, which could be invested in a risky
investment. Your wealth could either increase to 13, 000 Euro or increase only
to 10, 100 Euro, each with a probability of 50%.
Risky investment
How do you assess the risk of the aforementioned risky investment on a scale
from 1 (no risk at all) to 10 (very high risk)?
(b) Question 2
Another option is you can also invest the 10, 000 Euro in a risk-free alterna-
tive with safe 5% interest rate.
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Consider the following scenario: You could invest your initial wealth of
10, 000 Euro in either the risky investment or in the risk-free asset. How
much would you invest in the risky investment and in the risk-free invest-
ment, respectively?
Please, mark your answer on the following scale from 0 to 100, where 0
indicates that the full amount will be invested in the risk-free alternative and
100 indicates that the full amount will be invested in the risky alternative.
In the following situation, you can again choose between a risky alter-
native and a risk-free alternative
(a) Question 1
The risky investment either returns you an amount of 10, 000 Euro or it
returns an amount of 500 Euro.
How do you assess the risk of the aforementioned risky investment on a scale
from 1 (no risk at all) to 10 (very high risk)?
How do you assess the risk of the aforementioned risky investment on a scale
from 1 (no risk at all) to 10 (very high risk) if you get additional 4, 000 Euro
for sure?
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(b) Question 2
Now the amount you could alternatively get if you pick the risky alternative
(lottery), will vary from 500 Euro to 10, 000 Euro. Please mark for each
amount whether you would prefer the participation in the lottery or the
risk-free alternative.
Lottery Risk-free amount I prefer I prefer
the lottery the risk-free amount
9,000€
8,000€
7,000€
6,000€
5,000€
4,000€
3,000€
2,000€
1,000€
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Part 3
We present you a set of 10 decisions to make in the table below. Each decision is a
paired choice between two options: "Option A" and "Option B". You will make ten
choices and record them in the column on the right side. Only one of your choices will
be used in the end to determine your final earnings for this part of questionnaire. This
earning will be added to your final earnings.
We use a ten-sided die for determining the payoffs. The faces are numbered from 1
to 10 (the "0" face of the die will serve as number "10"). At the end of the experiment
when receiving your final earnings, you will throw the dice.
• Once to select one of the ten decisions to be used,
• A second time to determine what your earning is for the option you chose, "Option
A" or "Option B", for the particular decision selected.
Even though you will make ten decisions, only one of these will really affect your final
earnings. Nevertheless, you will not know in advance which decision will be selected.
Of course, each decision has an equal chance of being used.
• Look at decision 1.
Option A pays 8eif the throw of the ten-sided die is 1, and pays 6.4eif the throw
is between 2 and 10.
Option B pays 15.4eif the throw of the ten-sided die is 1, and pays 0.4eif the
throw is between 2 and 10.
• Look at decision 2.
Option A pays 8eif the throw of the ten-sided die is 1 or 2, and pays 6.4eif the
throw is between 3 and 10.
Option B pays 15.4eif the throw of the ten-sided die is 1 or 2, and pays 0.4eif
the throw is between 3 and 10.
• The other decisions are similar, except that as you move down the table, the
chances of the higher payoff for each option increase. In fact, for decision 10 in
the bottom row, the die will not be needed since each option pays the highest
payoff for sure. Therefore, in this decision row you make a choice between 8eand
15.4e.
To summarize,
• You will make ten choices now. For each decision row you are asked to make
a choice between Option A and Option B. You may choose Option A for some
decisions and 0ption B for other rows. You may change your decisions and make
them in any order.
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• At the end of the session, you will roll the ten-sided die to select which of the ten
decisions will be used.
• Then, you will roll the die again to determine your money earnings for the option
you chose for the selected decision. Earning for this choice will be added to your
other earnings, and will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment.
Should you have any questions, please raise your hand and we will come to you and an-
swer your questions in private. Please do not communicate with the other participants.
Please make your choices now and record for each of the ten decision rows whether
you prefer Option A or Option B.
Your choice
Decision 1
Option A: 1 chance out of 10 to earn 8eand 9 chances out of 10 to earn 6.4e Option A O
Option B: 1 chance out of 10 to earn 15.4eand 9 chances out of 10 to earn 0.4e Option B O
Decision 2
Option A: 2 chances out of 10 to earn 8eand 8 chances out of 10 to earn 6.4e Option A O
Option B: 2 chances out of 10 to earn 15.4eand 8 chances out of 10 to earn 0.4e Option B O
Decision 3
Option A: 3 chances out of 10 to earn 8eand 7 chances out of 10 to earn 6.4e Option A O
Option B: 3 chances out of 10 to earn 15.4eand 7 chances out of 10 to earn 0.4e Option B O
Decision 4
Option A: 4 chances out of 10 to earn 8eand 6 chances out of 10 to earn 6.4e Option A O
Option B: 4 chances out of 10 to earn 15.4eand 6 chances out of 10 to earn 0.4e Option B O
Decision 5
Option A: 5 chances out of 10 to earn 8eand 5 chances out of 10 to earn 6.4e Option A O
Option B: 5 chances out of 10 to earn 15.4eand 5 chances out of 10 to earn 0.4e Option B O
Decision 6
Option A: 6 chances out of 10 to earn 8eand 4 chances out of 10 to earn 6.4e Option A O
Option B: 6 chances out of 10 to earn 15.4eand 4 chances out of 10 to earn 0.4e Option B O
Decision 7
Option A: 7 chances out of 10 to earn 8eand 3 chances our of 10 to earn 6.4e Option A O
Option B: 7 chances out of 10 to earn 15.4eand 3 chances out of 10 to earn 0.4e Option B O
Decision 8
Option A: 8 chances out of 10 to earn 8eand 2 chances out of 10 to earn 6.4e Option A O
Option B: 8 chances out of 10 to earn 15.4eand 2 chances out of 10 to earn 0.4e Option B O
Decision 9
Option A: 9 chances out of 10 to earn 8eand 1 chances out of 10 to earn 6.4e Option A O
Option B: 9 chances out of 10 to earn 15.4eand 1 chance out of 10 to earn 0.4e Option B O
Decision 10
Option A: 10 chances out of 10 to earn 8eand 0 chances out of 10 to earn 6.4e Option A O
Option B: 10 chances out of 10 to earn 15.4eand 0 chances out of 10 to earn 0.4e Option B O
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Table 6: Relative Market Activity Performance: Probit regression
Dependent Variable: HL RL RT CE SQ
Reference Shift
Male -0.116 -0.176 0.318 0.116 0.153
(0.213) (0.277) (0.249) (0.116) (0.177)
Openness (T-score) 0.017** -0.001 -0.002 -0.016* 0.009
(0.008) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Consciousness (T-score) 0.011 -0.015 0.007 -0.006 0.001
(0.012) (0.011) (0.009) (0.007) (0.011)
Extraversion (T-score) -0.012 0.027** 0.005 -0.002 0.005
(0.011) (0.013) (0.008) (0.009) (0.012)
Agreeableness (T-score) -0.012 -0.013 -0.004 -0.005 0.002
(0.012) (0.011) (0.009) (0.012) (0.008)
Neuroticism (T-score) -0.007 0.004 -0.023** -0.003 -0.003
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.008) (0.010)
Age 0.005 -0.232** 0.148* -0.016 -1.057
(0.111) (0.110) (0.086) (0.093) (1.118)
Age2 -0.001 0.003** -0.002** 0.000 0.024
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.025)
Relative Trading Activity -0.833 -0.785 -0.602 0.288 -0.422
(0.863) (0.805) (0.657) (0.627) (0.726)
Constant 1.308 4.870** -1.558 1.782 11.540
(2.055) (2.053) (1.885) (1.816) (12.413)
N 183 183 183 182 183
Wald chi2 16.68 21.60 14.26 4.16 5.87
Prob>chi2 0.054 0.010 0.113 0.652 0.955
Pseudo R2 0.053 0.067 0.047 0.017 0.026
log pseudo-likelihood -98.720 -74.665 -117.293 -122.459 -122.112
Clusters 21 21 21 21 21
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗ indicates significance at the 0.001 level, ∗∗ at the 0.05 level, ∗
at the 0.10 level.
18
Table 7: Bubble Occurrence: Probit regression
Dependent Variable: HL RL RT CE SQ
Reference Shift
Male -0.172 -0.204 0.302 0.088 0.133
(0.225) (0.289) (0.249) (0.124) (0.167)
Openness (T-score) 0.016** -0.001 -0.002 -0.015* 0.009
(0.008) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Consciousness (T-score) 0.009 -0.016 0.006 -0.005 0.001
(0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.007) (0.012)
Extraversion (T-score) -0.014 0.025** 0.003 -0.002 0.004
(0.011) (0.013) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012)
Agreeableness (T-score) -0.013 -0.013 -0.004 -0.005 0.002
(0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.008)
Neuroticism (T-score) -0.006 0.003 -0.023** -0.002 -0.003
(0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010)
Age -0.001 -0.247** 0.145* -0.009 -0.930
(0.116) (0.116) (0.082) (0.093) (1.185)
Age2 -0.001 0.003** -0.002** 0.000 0.021
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.027)
Dummy Bubble Occurrence -0.205 0.043 -0.035 -0.205 -0.059
(0.173) (0.303) (0.203) (0.194) (0.199)
Constant 1.502 5.116** -1.483 1.735 10.194
(2.027) (2.141) (1.830) (1.807) (12.998)
N 183 183 183 182 183
Wald chi2 114.87 22.72 14.33 8.03 2.91
Prob>chi2 0.094 0.007 0.111 0.531 0.968
Pseudo R2 0.052 0.062 0.045 0.020 0.025
log pseudo-likelihood -98.863 -75.047 -117.571 -122.098 -122.217
Clusters 21 21 21 21 21
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ ∗ ∗ indicates significance at the 0.001 level, ∗∗ at the 0.05 level, ∗
at the 0.10 level.
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